Soft Power, Fair Play
The Secretary of State for Lesser Breeds, Margaret Beckett, has given the Observer the benefit of her insight into various matters. Peter Beaumont, the warrior for truth who has the honour of coaxing this verbal press release out of her, appears a little overwhelmed by the surroundings: "an office designed by George Gilbert Scott that has witnessed history's high drama - for better and worse - and has been used by Foreign Secretaries since 1868" - surroundings so awesome that they very nearly give him qualms over asking about Celebrity Big Brother. Freedom of the press is a wonderful thing. Needless to say, the Big Brother furore is "quite awful" in Beckett's opinion, apparently because our underlying values did not receive sufficient exposure.
These values, it seems, are to be the "chief weapon in the arsenal of soft power" - soft power, as opposed to the "'hard power' of the British squaddie on the ground", being due to come back into fashion once New Labour's fealty in the War on Terror is again owed to a Democrat rather than a Republican. Soft power is helpfully defined by Beaumont as "influence", and its chief weapon as "being seen to be 'fair and even-handed'", as when we tell neither Israel nor Hizbullah to cease firing while we facilitate arms exports to Israel. "If you ask on the Arab street, where there may not be a great deal of familiarity with the UK," says Beckett, "you might get a different response from some places that are more familiar with how Britain historically, as a people and as a country, has had this approach to being even-handed and fair." The question of Beckett's familiarity with Arab streets is, sadly, not explored.
"In their heart of hearts," Beckett continues, "a lot of people who are critical of us - and they have every right to be - feel things we have done have not fitted to that template [of British values]. But if that template did not exist they would not react in that way." If Blair, Brown and Beckett were not there to inform the Arab street of the nobility of British values, the Arab street would perhaps judge our actions less harshly, because they would see us as just another country, like the French or the Germans or the Italians or, if they were feeling particularly uncharitable, the Arabs themselves. It is precisely because our values are so much more exalted than those of these lesser nations that our occasional shortcomings are seen in such an unsparing light.
As to our fair and even-handed condoning of the Righteous State's Lebanon rampage, Beckett is aware that "Arab governments would have preferred us to have said more, and say it more loudly and differently"; nevertheless, those Arab governments - faithful representatives of the Arab streets, one and all - are "perfectly well aware of the amount of work we were doing behind the scenes to bring about what they wanted to see - an end to the violence and hostilities". Here Beaumont observes that "there is a problem. It is not those who are familiar with 'British values' who need to be persuaded they are a force for good. It is on those Arab streets that these arguments need to be made, and where persuasion is most difficult"; possibly because, as Beckett noted earlier, "if you big up your 'values' and then fall short on people's expectations, there is a double disappointment." Or maybe it's just the bombs.
On the subject of fairly and even-handedly bombing people whether they have weapons of mass destruction or not, Beckett says that "most Iraqis are happier than under Saddam"; her evidence is "opinion polls". Despite the hefty competition, Beaumont considers this "her weakest answer of the interview", and he senses she knows it, but again forbears from causing further distress to someone who is, after all, sitting in an office designed by George Gilbert Scott. Freedom of the press is a wonderful thing. Concerning Peter Hain's "public soul-searching over Iraq", Beckett says that he "was very clear, as we were discussing this in the run-up to the war... that Iraq was a danger to the world". Well, gosh. Perhaps somebody lied to him.
These values, it seems, are to be the "chief weapon in the arsenal of soft power" - soft power, as opposed to the "'hard power' of the British squaddie on the ground", being due to come back into fashion once New Labour's fealty in the War on Terror is again owed to a Democrat rather than a Republican. Soft power is helpfully defined by Beaumont as "influence", and its chief weapon as "being seen to be 'fair and even-handed'", as when we tell neither Israel nor Hizbullah to cease firing while we facilitate arms exports to Israel. "If you ask on the Arab street, where there may not be a great deal of familiarity with the UK," says Beckett, "you might get a different response from some places that are more familiar with how Britain historically, as a people and as a country, has had this approach to being even-handed and fair." The question of Beckett's familiarity with Arab streets is, sadly, not explored.
"In their heart of hearts," Beckett continues, "a lot of people who are critical of us - and they have every right to be - feel things we have done have not fitted to that template [of British values]. But if that template did not exist they would not react in that way." If Blair, Brown and Beckett were not there to inform the Arab street of the nobility of British values, the Arab street would perhaps judge our actions less harshly, because they would see us as just another country, like the French or the Germans or the Italians or, if they were feeling particularly uncharitable, the Arabs themselves. It is precisely because our values are so much more exalted than those of these lesser nations that our occasional shortcomings are seen in such an unsparing light.
As to our fair and even-handed condoning of the Righteous State's Lebanon rampage, Beckett is aware that "Arab governments would have preferred us to have said more, and say it more loudly and differently"; nevertheless, those Arab governments - faithful representatives of the Arab streets, one and all - are "perfectly well aware of the amount of work we were doing behind the scenes to bring about what they wanted to see - an end to the violence and hostilities". Here Beaumont observes that "there is a problem. It is not those who are familiar with 'British values' who need to be persuaded they are a force for good. It is on those Arab streets that these arguments need to be made, and where persuasion is most difficult"; possibly because, as Beckett noted earlier, "if you big up your 'values' and then fall short on people's expectations, there is a double disappointment." Or maybe it's just the bombs.
On the subject of fairly and even-handedly bombing people whether they have weapons of mass destruction or not, Beckett says that "most Iraqis are happier than under Saddam"; her evidence is "opinion polls". Despite the hefty competition, Beaumont considers this "her weakest answer of the interview", and he senses she knows it, but again forbears from causing further distress to someone who is, after all, sitting in an office designed by George Gilbert Scott. Freedom of the press is a wonderful thing. Concerning Peter Hain's "public soul-searching over Iraq", Beckett says that he "was very clear, as we were discussing this in the run-up to the war... that Iraq was a danger to the world". Well, gosh. Perhaps somebody lied to him.
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